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Abstract. Real-world information communities exhibit inherent struc-
tures that characterize a system that is stable and efficient for content
production and consumption. In this paper, we study such structures
through mathematical modelling and analysis. We formulate a generic
model of a community in which each member decides how they allo-
cate their time between content production and consumption with the
objective of maximizing their individual reward. We define the commu-
nity system as “stable and efficient” when a Nash equilibrium is reached
while the social welfare of the community is maximized. We investigate
the conditions for forming a stable and efficient community under two
variations of the model representing different internal relational struc-
tures of the community. Our analysis results show that the structure
with “a small core of celebrity producers” is the optimally stable and
efficient for a community. These analysis results provide possible expla-
nations to the sociological observations such as “the Law of the Few”
and also provide insights into how to effectively build and maintain the
structure of information communities.
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1 Introduction
Communities are an important structure that widely exists in real-world online
and offline social networks. A common type of community is the information
community in which the members of the community produce content and con-
sume the content produced by other members, with the most popular example
being Reddit [11] where each “subreddit” is essentially an information commu-
nity with a specific topic of interest. Real-world communities often exhibit inher-
ent structures such as the high density of interactions within the community and
the existence of a core set of active members who would contribute the majority
of the content in the community (“the Law of the Few”) [4, 14]. There have
been a large body of research work on community detection algorithms based
on such structures. However, there is still a lack of the formal understanding of
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why these structures would consistently and naturally emerge during the forma-
tion process of real-world communities. Understanding the formation process of
these natural structures is important as it provides us a microscopic view of the
working mechanisms of communities and would enable us to utilize communities
more efficiently.
Our overall hypothesis is the following: real-world social network structures
have been going through an evolutionary process, and as a result of that only
the optimal structure (in terms of stability and efficiency) can survive, sustain
therefore exist widely in real-world social networks. In other words, if we observe
a widely existing structure in real-world social networks, then this structure must
be optimal in the sense that it has stable user behaviours and it is efficient for
the purpose of the network.
In the case of information communities, each member in the community is
an agent who can choose to spend certain portions of their time in producing
content items or in consuming content produced by other members. In order
for the community to be stable, all members’ time allocation strategies should
collectively form a Nash equilibrium, i.e., each member would get penalized by
deviating from the equilibrium strategy. A member in the community can be
rewarded by either production or consumption. For consumption, the rewarded
is from the consumed content itself; for production, a member is rewarded when
the content she produces is consumed by other members of the community (the
reputation effect). A community structure is called “efficient” when it can pro-
vide its members the highest possible amount of reward. If we use a mathe-
matical model to formulate the above behaviours and efficiency measures, we
will then be able to formally analyze the condition under which the community
structure is optimally stable and efficient, therefore obtain a mathematical de-
scription of the “surviving and sustaining” community structure. The validity of
the model would be verified if the result of the analysis happens to agree with
the widely-existing structures observed in real-world communities. Compared to
the empirical observations, the formal analytical results would provide us more
refined understanding of the microscopic working mechanisms of the real-world
communities.
In this paper, we formulate a model that captures the production and con-
sumption behaviours inside an information community. Our analysis results show
that the structure with a small set of “celebrity producers” is the optimally sta-
ble and efficient structure. These analysis results provide possible explanations
to the sociological observations such as “the Law of the Few” and also provide
insights into how to effectively build and maintain the structure of information
communities.
2 Related Works
Social network analysis has been one of the fastest growing research fields in
the 21st century. We refer readers to Scott et al. [12] for a comprehensive cov-
erage of the development of the subject, rather than listing the large collection
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of references in this paper. Experimental works observed interesting properties
of real-world complex networks such as the power-law degree distribution, the
small-world phenomena and the community structure. These observations lead to
modelling works that tried to explain why the observed properties would emerge,
such models include the preferential attachment models, the copying model and
the forest fire model. However, most of these works were studying macroscopic
structural properties rather than looking into the internal microscopic structures
of the network.
The community structure has been an interesting topic for researcher in
the field of social network analysis. A large body of work has been devoted
to modelling and detecting community structures in large scale social networks
(e.g., [2, 8, 10, 6, 5]). The networks are often represented by graphs in which the
vertices represent underlying social entities and the edges represent some sort of
social tie or interaction between pairs of vertices. Our model differs in the sense
that it also considers the user behaviours on top of the network connections.
In [1], the efficiency of a network in terms of information diffusion is studied,
a mathematical analysis is perform to investigate the optimal network structure
to achieve the best efficiency for information diffusion (high precision, high recall
and low diameter), and the result shows that a Kronecker-graph [6] would satisfy
such conditions. The approach taken in [1] is similar to the approach we take in
this paper except that we are more focussed on the community related aspects.
The work in [3] used a game-theoretic model to study the emergence of the “Law
of the Few” but it is also in the context of information diffusion rather than about
communities. The work in [7] is the closest to the interest of this paper. In [7],
a game theoretic model is formulated to analyze the community structures in
terms of content production and consumption. Each member’s strategy involves
choosing a particular interest to produce or consume content on. The result
shows that in the Nash equilibrium of the model the members’ choices form
community structures. The difference of our work from [7] is that we focus on
the internal structure of a single community rather than on the scale of multiple
communities, and besides the Nash equilibrium, we also take the social welfare
into consideration.
3 Model
We will first describe the general configuration of the model and the pay-
off/reward functions, then in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, we introduce two
variations of modelling the internal relations between the community members.
Both models will be analyzed and the results will be compared in Section 4.
3.1 General Configuration
We have a single community with n members indexed by 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Each mem-
ber is capable of both producing and consuming content items. The produced
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content items could be chosen by all members or a subset of the members of the
community for consumption. Each member has a limited total amount of time
which could be allocated to either production or consumption, and each mem-
ber make a decision about how much of their time to allocate to production and
consumption. A member is rewarded if their products are consumed by members
of the community (the production reward), or if the member consumes an item
that is produced by a member of the community (the consumption reward).
Each member’s objective is to maximize their total individual reward from both
production and consumption.
The time slot: In our model, we investigate everything that happens within
a unit time. The assumption is that the long term behaviour of a member is the
repetition of their behaviour within a unit time.
Rates of content production and consumption: We define Np ≥ 0 to be the
number of content items that a member can produce if they were to spend 100%
of their unit time on production; and we let Nc ≥ 0 be the number of items that
a member can consume within a unit time slot if they were to spend 100% of
their time on consumption. We assume that all members share the same values
of Np and Nc, and we assume the following inequality:
0 ≤
Nc
nNp
≤ 1 (1)
This assumption is reasonable because nNp is the largest possible number of
content items that can be produced, an Nc value that is larger than nNp would
be unrealistic.
A member’s time allocation strategy: Let αi (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) be the portion of
the unit time that member i allocates to production (therefore 1−α is allocated
to consumption). Each member chooses their own αi, we will investigate if a
set of choices of αi would lead to a Nash equilibrium. Within the unit time, a
member can consume at most (1 − αi) · Nc items. If the number of available
items is less than or equal to this number, then each member would consume
all the available items without any choice; if the total number of available items
is greater than this number, then the member would choose a subset (of size
(1− αi) ·Nc) of the available items to consume, uniformly at random.
The production reward models the “reputation effect” in social networks,
i.e., having content products consumed by other people is rewarding for the
producer of the content. The reward for each item that a member produces is
proportional to the number of members who consume the item, with a constant
factor rp, i.e., if an item is consumed by m members, then the reward for this
item is rp · m. The total production reward for a member is the sum of the
rewards of all items that the member produces. The constant factor rp is the
same for all members. The consumption reward of a given item is a constant rc.
The total consumption reward of a member is rc multiplied by the number of
items consumed by the member. The total individual reward of a member in the
community is the sum of their production reward and consumption reward. The
sum of the total individual rewards of all members in the community is the social
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welfare. While each member tries to maximize their own individual reward, the
overall efficiency of the community is measured by its social welfare.
The following two subsections will define two variations of the internal rela-
tional structure of the community.
3.2 The Celebrity-Follower Community Structure
Under the celebrity-follower relational structure, a subset of the members of the
community are “celebrities” that are followed by everyone in the community, i.e.,
the content items produced by a celebrity member can be seen by all members of
the community. A non-celebrity member has zero followers, i.e., an item produced
by a non-celebrity member cannot be seen or consumed by any member.
Let η be the portion of celebrity members, i.e., the number of celebrity mem-
bers is ηn. When η = 1, all members are connected via a complete graph. When
η is small, we have a small core of celebrities that would be responsible for pro-
ducing all content items in the community. If visualized as a directed graph, the
structure would have η · n2 edges in total. Note that we are assuming a member
can be a follower of themselves so the graph can have self-pointing edges. This
would lead to cleaner analysis results.
Note that we are not making any assumptions about how large the value of η
is, and it is interesting to see whether the efficiency of the community system can
be different with η’s value being in different ranges. In real-world communities,
we often observe patterns that are similar to the celebrity-follower structure, i.e.,
a small subset of “elite contributors” would produce most of the content items
that are consumed by all members of the community, and a community typically
has a significant portion of “lurkers”. We will be able to provide a theoretical
explanation to this real-world phenomenon.
3.3 The Uniform Community Structure
In contrast to the celebrity-follower structure where the members play unequal
roles in the community, the uniform relational structure has all members with
the equal role, i.e., every member has the same number of followers and follows
the same number of other members. In terms of a graph, it is a regular graph
where every vertex has the same in-degrees and out-degrees.
To make this structure comparable with the celebrity-follower structure,
we let it have the same number of edges as the celebrity-follower graph. The
celebrity-follower graph discussed in the previous section has η ·n2 edges, there-
fore, in the uniform graph, we let each vertex have in-degree η · n as well as
out-degree η · n.
3.4 Summary of the model
Overall, our model is a game-theoretic model where each agent (member of
the community) chooses a strategy (αi) with the objective of optimizing their
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individual reward. The efficiency of the whole community is measured by the
social welfare (total reward of all members). The stability of the community
is indicated by whether the strategies of all members collectively form a Nash
equilibrium.
4 Analysis
Our hypothesis is that, in order to exist and sustain in the real world, a social
structure must be stable and efficient. For an information community, this means
that the members’ strategies form a Nash equilibrium while the social welfare
of the community is maximized. Therefore, our analysis will take the following
approach: we first derive the set of members’ strategies that would maximize the
social welfare of the community, then we investigate the condition for this set of
strategies to form a Nash equilibrium.
In Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, we perform the analyses for the celebrity-
follower and uniform structures, respectively, then we will compare and discuss
the analysis results.
4.1 Analysis of the Celebrity-Follower Structure
The following theorem summarizes the analysis results for communities with the
celebrity-follower structure.
Theorem 1. For a community with the celebrity-follower structure where there
are η ·n celebrity members, the maximum social welfare and the Nash equilibrium
are described in the following cases.
Case 1: if η < min( Nc
nNp
, 1− Nc
nNp
, 1− Ncrc
nNprp
), then the maximum social welfare
is reached when a member i of the community takes the following strategy:
αi =
{
1 if member i is a celebrity
0 otherwise
(2)
The maximum social welfare Gmax is the following:
Gmax = η(1− η)n
2Np(rp + rc) (3)
This set of strategies always form a Nash equilibrium under this case.
Case 2: if 1
2
< Nc
nNp
≤ 1 and 1 − Nc
nNp
≤ η ≤ Nc
nNp
, then the maximum
social welfare is reached when a member i of the community follows the following
strategy.
αi =
{
Nc
Nc+ηnNp
if member i is a celebrity
0 otherwise
(4)
The maximum social welfare Gmax is the following:
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Gmax =
ηn2NcNp(rp + rc)
Nc + ηnNp
(5)
However, this set of strategies never forms a Nash equilibrium under this case.
Case 3: if 0 ≤ Nc
nNp
≤ 1
2
and Nc
nNp
≤ η ≤ 1 − Nc
nNp
, then the maximum
social welfare is reached when a member i of the community follows the following
strategy.
αi =
{
Nc
ηnNp
if member i is a celebrity
0 otherwise
(6)
The maximum social welfare under this strategy is
Gmax = Nc
(
n−
Nc
Np
)
(rp + rc) (7)
This set of strategies never forms a Nash equilibrium under this case.
Case 4: η > max( Nc
nNp
, 1 − Nc
nNp
), the social welfare is maximized when a
member i of the community follows the following strategy.
αi =
{
Nc
Nc+ηnNp
if member i is a celebrity
0 otherwise
(8)
The maximum social welfare under this strategy is
Gmax =
ηn2NcNp(rp + rc)
Nc + ηnNp
(9)
This set of strategies never forms a Nash equilibrium under this case.
The detailed proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the appendix. This theorem
shows that Case 1 is the only case where the members’ strategies reach a Nash
equilibrium while the social welfare is maximized. In other words, in order for the
community to be optimally stable and efficient, the portion of celebrity members
must be small enough, i.e., η < min( Nc
nNp
, 1− Nc
nNp
, 1− Ncrc
nNprp
).
4.2 Analysis of the Uniform Structure
The following theorem summarizes the analysis results for communities with the
celebrity-follower structure.
Theorem 2. For a community with the uniform structure where each member
has ηn followers and follows ηn members, the maximum social welfare is reached
when the following set of strategies is applied.
αi =
Nc
Nc + ηnNp
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n (10)
The maximum social welfare Gmax is the following:
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Gmax =
ηn2NpNc(rc + rp)
Nc + ηnNp
(11)
The above set of strategies forms a Nash equilibrium if and only if the following
condition is true.
η ≤
(
Ncrc
nNprp
+
1
n
)
(12)
The detailed proof of Theorem 2 can be found in the appendix. This result
shows that, assuming the uniform community structure, there exist a simple set
of strategies that is stable while the social welfare is maximized. What we are
interested in is how the optimal efficiency of the uniform structure compares
with that of a community with the celebrity-follower structure. The following
theorem provides us a formal result.
Theorem 3. Let Gmax -celebrity be the maximum social welfare with a Nash equi-
librium for the celebrity-follower community structure (Eq (3)) and Gmax -uniform
be the maximum social welfare with a Nash equilibrium for the uniform commu-
nity structure (Eq (11)). The following is always true:
Gmax -celebrity ≥ Gmax -uniform (13)
The detailed proof of Theorem 3 can be found in the appendix. This theorem
provides a simple and clear result: given being in its optimally stable and efficient
state, a community with the celebrity-follower structure always has a better
optimal social welfare than a community with the uniform structure.
5 Discussions
The combination of the analysis results in Section 4.1 and 4.2 provide us two dif-
ferent angles of explaining the common “law-of-the-few” structural patterns that
widely exist in real-life information communities. A given community structure,
in order to exist and sustain, must be both stable and efficient, meaning that
the community can stably stay at the state with the maximum social welfare.
Theorem 1 tells us that the community can only be stable and efficient if there is
a small enough “core” of celebrity members who will actively contribute all the
content to be consumed by all members of the community, while the majority
of the community members would simply consume the content produced by the
core members. A community structure that does not satisfy this condition would
not be stable therefore would not commonly exist in reality.
Moreover, among the different possible structure that are both stable and
efficient, some structures are more efficient than others. Theorem 3 shows that
the small-core celebrity-follower structure is not only stable and efficient, but also
it is more efficient than other stable structures such as the uniform structure.
With the above two factors taken into account, the celebrity-follower struc-
ture with a small set of celebrities becomes the winner, therefore becomes the
commonly existing structure in real-world information communities.
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In the equilibrium state, the strategies of the celebrity and non-celebrity
members are clearly differentiated: the celebrity members should dedicate all
of their time in production whereas the non-celebrity members should spend
all of their time on consumption. These specialized producing and consuming
behaviours also coincide with real-world observations: in a web service such as
Reddit, the visitors of a typical subreddit would often separate into two different
roles, i.e., the “active contributors” who frequently post content in the subreddit
and the “lurkers” who would always just consume content silently.
The analysis results also provide insights into how to effectively build and
maintain information communities. The most important takeaway from our anal-
ysis results is that there should be mechanisms that encourage the formation of a
small-core celebrity-follower structure inside the community. For example, many
online social network applications use features such as “thumb-up” or “upvote”
to promote and reward high quality content that are liked by many community
members. Besides providing effective content filtering (ranking by votes), this
voting mechanism also encourages the optimally stable and efficient community
structure: since the production reward is only earned when a post is upvoted,
the members who would produce low-quality content would not be rewarded
and would essentially become the non-celebrity members in the celebrity-follower
structure. The members who produce high-quality content would be rewarded by
the upvotes and becomes the celebrities in the community. The size of the core
of celebrities will tend to be small if the display of the content in the community
is ranked by popularity: most members will only consume a small portion of the
top-ranked content items therefore only a small set of high quality producers
would actually be rewarded and become the real core of the community. This
analysis would lead to an interesting and counter-intuitive hypothesis: if the con-
tent display of the community is such that different members would see a diverse
range of different items, then this would cause the formation of a larger-sized
celebrity core or a uniform-like structure in the community which would make
the community structure less stable. It would be interesting to empirically verify
if this hypothesis is true in practice.
Another interesting insight is that, in the optimal community structure, the
number of celebrity members in the core, i.e., ηn˙, must satisfy that η·n < Nc/Np.
This means that the size of the of celebrities core does not increase as the size
of the community n increases. This could be a possible reason of why we have
communities in the first place: having a large number of people communicating in
a single giant community is inefficient in terms of the total amount of production
because it only allows a small number of core members to contribute in content
production. Larger total production rate can be achieved by dividing people into
different smaller communities each of which has its own core members, since
the total number of people who will contribute in content production would be
multiplied by the number of communities.
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6 Conclusions
This paper attempts to obtain a formal understanding of the natural structural
patterns of real-world information communities. We formulate a mathematical
model that describes the generic content production and consumption behaviours
in a community. The analysis result shows that the small-core celebrity-follower
structure is the optimal structure that would lead to the optimally efficient
and stable community. These analytical results agree with the sociological ob-
servations on real-world information communities. Besides providing a refined
microscopic view of the working mechanisms of information communities, the
analysis results also provide useful insights into how to better build and main-
tain the structure of information communities. Designing efficient mechanisms
that encourage the formation of stable and efficient communities would be an
interesting topic for future works.
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Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 1
In the following two subsections we will prove the two cases separately.
A.1 Proof of Case 1 and 2
We will first analyze the strategies for maximizing the social welfare and then
investigate the Nash equilibriums of the such strategies.
Maximum Social Welfare for Case 1 and Case 2
In this case, η < Nc
nNp
⇒ ηnNp < Nc, i.e., the celebrity members are not able sat-
isfy everyone’s consumption demand even if they are producing at full capacity.
First, we present the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The optimal maximum social welfare is reached only if all non-
celebrity members have αi = 0.
Proof. This result is easy to see since a product of a non-celebrity member never
gets consumed by others, a non-celebrity member’s optimal strategy is always
to spend 100% of their time on consumption.
Lemma 2. When the social welfare is maximized, all celebrity members must
choose the same αi value.
Proof. The proof is very similar to part of the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix B,
therefore is omitted for succinctness. The idea is to compare an arbitrary con-
figuration of αi values with the configuration where everyone choose the same
value.
Now let’s investigate the αi value that would maximize the social welfare
for Case 1 and Case 2. There are two cases that are possible when calculating
the social welfare of the community: whether the celebrity members are under-
supplied or over-supplied. For the celebrity members to be over-supplied, we
need the following to hold:
(1 − αi)Nc ≤ αiηnNp (14)
⇔ αi ≥
Nc
Nc + ηnNp
(15)
Otherwise, the celebrity members are under-supplied.
When the celebrity members are over-supplied, the social welfare is calculated
as the following:
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G = αiηnNp
[
(1 − η)n+
(1 − αi)Nc
αiηnNp
· ηn
]
(rp + rc) (16)
= ηn(rp + rc) [αi ((1− η)nNp −Nc) +Nc] (17)
When the celebrity members are under-supplied, the social welfare is calcu-
lated as the following:
G = αiηn
2Np (18)
Combining Eq (16) and (18), the social welfare for Case 1 and Case 2 is the
following.
G =
{
αiηn
2Np if 0 ≤ αi <
Nc
Nc+ηnNp
ηn(rp + rc) [αi ((1− η)nNp −Nc) +Nc] if
Nc
Nc+ηnNp
≤ αi ≤ 1
(19)
When the celebrity members are under-supplied, G is always an increasing func-
tion of αi. When the celebrity members are over-supplied, G could be either
an increase or decreasing function of αi depending on whether the coefficient
((1 − η)nNp −Nc) is positive or negative. Note that
(1− η)nNp −Nc > 0 ⇔ η < 1−
Nc
nNp
(20)
Therefore, for Case 1 where η < 1− Nc
nNp
, the social welfare G is maximized when
αi = 1, and the maximum social welfare is
Gmax = η(1− η)n
2Np(rp + rc) (21)
Therefore, for Case 2 where η ≥ 1− Nc
nNp
, the social welfare G is maximized when
αi =
Nc
Nc+ηnNp
, and the maximum social welfare is
Gmax =
ηn2NcNp(rp + rc)
Nc + ηnNp
(22)
Nash Equilibrium for Case 1
Now consider the Nash equilibrium for Case 1. For a non-celebrity member,
αi = 0 is clearly the best strategy since there is no additional reward if they
spent any time in production.
For a celebrity member, consider the small deviation from the equilibrium
strategy, i.e., rather than choosing αi = 1, it chooses αi = 1− δ for some δ > 0.
This member’s product reward is decreased by δNp(1 − η)nrp. This member’s
consumption reward is increased by up to δNcrc. We want to show that the
change of the member’s individual reward to be negative, i.e.,
∆R ≤ δNcrc − δNp(1− η)nrp < 0 (23)
⇔ η < 1−
Ncrc
nNprp
(24)
which is true according to the assumption of Case 1. Therefore, the Nash equi-
librium of Case 1 is proven.
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Nash Equilibrium for Case 2
Consider a celebrity member who would change their αi to αi+ δ and αi− δ for
some δ > 0. In order for a Nash equilibrium to be formed, it is necessary that
both ways of changing result in a smaller individual reward.
If the strategy is changed to αi + δ, then the gain of production reward is
up to δNpnrp and the loss of consumption reward is δNcrc. In order for the
individual reward to decrease, we need:
∆R ≤ δNpnrp − δNcrc < 0 (25)
⇔
Ncrc
nNprp
> 1 (26)
If the strategy is changed to αi − δ, then the loss of production reward is
δNpnrp and the gain of consumption reward is up to δNcrc. In order for the
individual reward to decrease, we need:
∆R ≤ δNcrc − δNpnrp < 0 (27)
⇔
Ncrc
nNprp
< 1 (28)
A Nash equilibrium requires that both (26) and (28) to be true, which is
impossible, therefore the Nash equilibrium cannot exist. The Nash equilibrium
of Case 1 is proven, which completes all proofs for Case 1 and Case 2.
A.2 Proof of Case 3 and Case 4
Case 3 and Case 4 are the cases where the celebrity members are capable of
supplying any member in community, i.e., ηnNp ≥ Nc. First of all, Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 both apply to this part of the proof. And we have the following
additional lemma.
Lemma 3. When the social welfare is maximized, a non-celebrity member must
not be over-supplied, and a celebrity member must not be under-supplied.
Proof. Suppose the non-celebrity members were over-supplied, then the high-
quality members must also be over-supplied. Reducing production time will in-
crease the total number of consumptions for sure, therefore the global welfare
would be increased.
Similarly, suppose the celebrity members were under-supplied, then the non-
celebrity members must also be under-supplied. Increasing production time will
increase the total number of consumptions for sure, therefore the global welfare
would be increased.
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Maximum Social Welfare for Case 3
We now write down the expression of the social welfare. Because of Lemma 2, we
let αh be the common αi value of all celebrity members, then the total number of
produced items is αhηnNp. For each item, the expected number of consumptions
from the non-celebrity members is (1−η)n since each non-celebrity member is not
over-supplied; the expected number of consumptions from the celebrity members
is the following (because they are not under-supplied):
(1 − αh)Nc
αhNpηn
· ηn =
Nc
Np
(
1
αh
− 1
)
(29)
Therefore, total reward is the (rp + rc) multiplied by the total number of con-
sumptions, which is
R = (rp + rc) · αhNpηn ·
[
(1− η)n+
Nc
Np
(
1
αh
− 1
)]
(30)
= (rp + rc) ·
[
αh
[
Npη(1− η)n
2)−Ncηn
]
+Ncηn
]
(31)
The expression in (31) could be an increasing or decreasing function of αh. It
depends the sign of coefficient of αh. Therefore, we need to divide into two
sub-cases, which are exactly Case 3 and Case 4.
Case 3: The coefficient is non-negative, i.e.,[
Npη(1− η)n
2 −Ncηn
]
≥ 0 (32)
⇔ η ≤ 1−
Nc
Np
(33)
In this case, to maximize the global welfare, αh should be as large as possible,
i.e., αh should be the largest possible value that keeps the non-celebrity members
non-oversupplied. It is the value that generates exactly Nc items, which is
αh =
Nc
ηnNp
(34)
Plug the above value into Eq. (31), the maximum social welfare is
Gmax = (rp + rc)Nc
(
n−
Nc
Np
)
(35)
Nash Equilibrium for Case 3
Now investigate the Nash equilibrium for Case 3 by consider the following two
types of changes (let δ > 0 denote the change amount):a celebrity member
increasing from αi to αh + δ; and a celebrity member decreasing from αh to
αh − δ.
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If the strategy is changed to αh + δ, then the gain of production reward is
δNp((1− ηn)n+ ηn(1−αh))rp and the loss of consumption reward is δNcrc. In
order for the individual reward to decrease, we need:
∆R = δNp((1 − ηn)n+ ηn(1 − αh))rp − δNcrc < 0 (36)
⇔
Ncrc
(nNp −Nc)rp
> 1 (37)
If the strategy is changed to αh + δ, then the loss of production reward is
δNp((1− ηn)n+ ηn(1−αh))rp and the gain of consumption reward is δNcrc. In
order for the individual reward to decrease, we need:
∆R = δNcrcδNp((1− ηn)n+ ηn(1− αh))rp < 0 (38)
⇔
Ncrc
(nNp −Nc)rp
< 1 (39)
A Nash equilibrium requires that both (37) and (39) to be true, which is
impossible, therefore the Nash equilibrium cannot exist. The Nash equilibrium
of Case 3 is proven.
Maximum Social Welfare for Case 4
Case 4: The coefficient in (31) is negative, i.e.,[
Npη(1− η)n
2 −Ncηn
]
< 0 (40)
⇔ η > 1−
Nc
nNp
(41)
In this case, to maximize the social welfare, αh should be as small as possible,
i.e., αh should be the smallest possible value that keeps the celebrity members
non-under-supplied. The number of produced items should be exactly (1−αh)Nc
items, i.e.,
αhNpηn = (1− αh)Nc (42)
⇔ αh =
Nc
Nc + ηnNp
(43)
Plug the above value into Eq. (31), the maximum global welfare is
Gmax =
ηn2NcNp(rp + rc)
Nc + ηnNp
(44)
Note that, Case 4’s optimal state for social welfare is in fact exactly the same
as that of Case 2. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of Case 4 follows the same
configuration as that of Case 2, which means this set of strategy cannot form a
Nash equilibrium. Hence, we have completed the proof for Theorem 1.
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B Proof of Theorem 2
The claim is that the maximum social welfare is reached when (1) all members
have the same αi value and (2) the number of produced items is just enough
every member’s consumption. We consider three cases when calculating the social
welfare of the community: everyone is over-supplied, everyone is under-supplied
and some people are over-supplied while others are under-supplied. Let s =∑n
i=1 αi denote the sum of everyone’s αi value.
Case 1: Everyone is over-supplied with content. The consumption reward a
member i is simply (1−αi)Ncrc, therefore the global total consumption reward
is
n∑
i=1
(1− αi)Ncrc = Ncrc(n−
n∑
i=1
αi) = Ncrc(n− s) (45)
The global total production reward is equal to the total number of consumption
multiplied by rp, which is
rp ·
n∑
i=1
(1 − αi)Nc = Ncrp
(
n−
n∑
i=1
αi
)
= Ncrp(n− s) (46)
Therefore the total global welfare for Case 1 is the sum of (45) and (46) which
is
G(α) = Ncrc(n− s) +Ncrp(n− s) = Nc(rp + rc)
(
n−
n∑
i=1
αi
)
(47)
We can see that, in the case of everyone being over-supplied, the social welfare
would decrease if anybody increases their αi; the optimal value for this case is
reached when everyone reduces their αi as much as possible as long as everyone
is still over-supplied.
Now we want to show that the global welfare for this case is no greater than
the maximum global welfare shown in in Equation (11) of Theorem 2, i.e., we
want to show the following
Nc(rp + rc)
(
n−
n∑
i=1
αi
)
≤
ηn2NpNc(rc + rp)
Nc + ηnNp
(48)
⇔
(
n−
n∑
i=1
αi
)
≤
ηn2Np
Nc + ηnNp
= n ·
(
1−
Nc
Nc + ηnNp
)
(49)
⇔
(
n∑
i=1
αi
)
≥ n ·
Nc
Nc + ηnNp
(50)
Note that Nc/(Nc + ηnNp) is the optimal αi value which make the number
of produced items exactly the same as the number needed by every member.
The inequality in (50) must be true because if it were not true, it would cause
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a member to be under-supplied, which violates the assumption for this case.
Completing the proof for Case 1.
Case 2: Everyone is under-supplied with content. In this case, each mem-
ber consumes all content items that are available for them, therefore the total
consumption reward is
ηnNprc
n∑
i=1
αi = ηnNprcs (51)
The total production reward is again the total number of consumptions mul-
tiplied by rp. Each of the produced items is consumed ηn times, thus we have
the total production reward as follows:
ηnrp
n∑
i=1
αiNp = ηNprpns (52)
Summing up the total consumption reward and the total production rewards,
the total global welfare for Case 2 is
G(α) = ηNp(rp + rc)ns = ηNp(rp + rc)n
(
n∑
i=1
αi
)
(53)
We can see that, in the case of everyone being under-supplied, the social welfare
would decrease if anybody decreases their αi; the optimal value for this case is
reached when everyone increase their αi as much as possible as long as everyone
is still under-supplied.
Again, we want to show that the global welfare for this case is no greater
than the maximum global welfare shown in in Equation (11) of Theorem 2, i.e.,
we want to show the following
ηNp(rp + rc)n
(
n∑
i=1
αi
)
≤
ηn2NpNc(rc + rp)
Nc + ηnNp
(54)
⇔
n∑
i=1
αi ≤ n ·
Nc
Nc + ηnNp
(55)
Again, since Nc/(Nc+ηnNp) is the αi value that makes the number of produced
items exactly the same as the number needed by every member. The inequality
in (55) must be true because if it were not true, it would cause a member to be
over-supplied, which violates the assumption for this case. Completing the proof
for Case 2.
Case 3 is in between Case 1 and Case 2, i.e., we assume that a portion of the
members in the community are over-supplied while others are under-supplied.
Let α¯ =
∑n
i=1 αi/n be the average value of all members αi values. We will
compare an arbitrary configuration in Case 3 with the one where everyone choose
the same αi = α¯. Note that, if everyone choose the same αi, it is either Case
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1 or Case 2, i.e., either everyone is over-supplied or everyone is under-supplied.
We want to show that any configuration in Case 3 has smaller social welfare
than the configuration where everyone has the same αi = α¯. We call this two
configurations the “original configuration” and the “average configuration”.
Because of the choice of the value of α¯, the sum of everyone’s αi value stay
the same, therefore the total number of produced items is the same between the
two configurations. We will compare the social welfares of the two configurations
in two cases.
Case 3.1: Everyone is over-supplied in the average configuration. Then every-
one consumes exactly Nc(1 − α¯) items in the average configuration. Therefore,
the consumption reward for each member is Ncrc(1 − α¯). In the original con-
figuration, some members have greater αi values than α¯ and some others have
smaller αi values than α¯. Consider a pair of members of which member A has
αi = α¯+δ and member B has αi = α¯−δ. For member A, since she becomes even
more over-supplied and spends less time on consumption, her consumption re-
ward decreases by exactly δNcrc. On the other hand, member B’s consumption
reward increases by at most δNcrc, depending on whether B becomes under-
supplied after decreasing her αi value from α¯. Therefore, the all-members total
consumption reward of the original configuration is no greater that of the average
configuration.
In terms of the total production reward, recall that it is the total num-
ber of consumptions multiplied by rp. Let K denote the total number of items
produced. In the average configuration, for each item, the expected number
of consumptions contributed by each member is (1 − α¯Nc)/K. In the original
configuration, consider again member A with αi = α¯ + δ and member B with
αi = α¯−δ. Member A’s contribution decreases by exactly δNc/K, while member
B’s contribution increases by at most δNc/K. Therefore, the all-members total
production reward of the original configuration is no greater that of the average
configuration. Thus, we can conclude for Case 3.1 that the global welfare of the
original configuration is no greater than that of the average configuration.
Case 3.2: Everyone is under-supplied in the average configuration. Then ev-
eryone consumes exactly K = ηNp
∑n
i=1 αi items in the average configuration.
Therefore, the total consumption reward is nKrc. Now consider the original con-
figuration with member A having αi = α¯+ δ and member B having αi = α¯− δ.
For member B, she is still under-supplied and her consumption reward stays the
same since the total number of items stays the same. For member A, her con-
sumption reward stays the same of she is still under-supplied and it decreases
if she becomes over-supplied and consumes less than K items. Therefore, the
all-members total consumption reward of the original configuration is no greater
that of the average configuration.
In terms of the total production reward, the average configuration has a
total production reward of nKrp, whereas the original configuration can have
the same total production rewards, or less if anyone becomes over-supplied by
having a larger αi and consumes less K items. Therefore, the all-members total
production reward of the original configuration is no greater that of the average
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configuration. Thus, we can conclude for Case 3.2 that the social welfare of the
original configuration is no greater than that of the average configuration.
Since the average configuration belongs to either Case 1 or Case 2, both of
which are proven to have no greater global welfare than the maximum we claimed
in (11). Hence, the global welfare in (11) is the maximum possible global welfare
of the community.
Nash Equilibrium for the Uniform Structure
When every member chooses αi = Nc/(Nc + ηnNp), the consumption reward of
a member is
Rc
(
αi =
Nc
Nc + ηnNp
)
= (1− αi)Ncrc =
ηnNpNcrc
Nc + ηnNp
(56)
The production reward of a member is
Rp
(
αi =
Nc
Nc + nNp
)
= αiNprpηn =
ηnNpNcrp
Nc + ηnNp
(57)
The total reward is the sum of the above two which is
R
(
αi =
Nc
Nc + ηnNp
)
=
ηnNpNc(rc + rp)
Nc + ηnNp
(58)
Now we calculate the reward for member i when she changes her strategy is
changed to αi + δ. We divide the analysis into two cases: δ > 0 and δ < 0.
Case 1: δ > 0, i.e., member i increases αi. This will make some members
over-supplied. For member i, the consumption reward decreases because of the
reduced amount of consumption time, i.e.,
∆Rc = −δNcrc (59)
The total number of available items for the followers is now ηαinNp + δNp, the
probability of an item being chosen is
ηαinNp
ηαinNp + δNp
=
ηαin
ηαin+ δ
(60)
The production reward for member i becomes
(αi + δ)ηn ·
ηαin
ηαin+ δ
·Nprp (61)
Therefore, the change in member i’s total reward is
∆R = (αi + δ)ηn ·
ηαin
ηαin+ δ
·Nprp − ηαinNprp − δNcrc (62)
We want to check the condition for ∆R < 0. In the following derivation, we let
K = Nprp/Ncrc.
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∆R = (αi + δ)ηn ·
ηαin
ηαin+ δ
·Nprp − ηαinNprp − δNcrc < 0 (63)
⇒ K
(
αiη
2n2(αi + δ)
αiηn+ δ
− αiηn
)
< δ (64)
⇒
Kαiηnδ(ηn− 1)
αiηn+ δ
< δ (65)
⇒
Kαiηn(ηn− 1)
αiηn+ δ
< 1 # δ > 0 (66)
⇒ δ > αiηn(Kηn−K − 1) (67)
To make sure (67) is satisfied, we must have
αiηn(Kηn−K − 1) ≤ 0 (68)
⇒ (Kηn−K − 1) ≤ 0 (69)
⇒ K ≤
1
ηn− 1
(70)
⇒
Nprp
Ncrc
≤
1
ηn− 1
(71)
⇒ η ≤
(
Ncrc
nNprp
+
1
n
)
(72)
Summary of Case 1: If (72) is true, then the total reward for member i decreases
if she increases her αi to αi + δ (δ > 0).
Case 2: δ < 0, i.e., member i decreases her αi, then everyone in the community
become under-supplied. For member i, the production reward is reduced simply
because of the reduced value of αi, i.e.,
∆Rp = δηnNprp (73)
The consumption reward for member i is also reduced because of the reduced
number of items available for consumption (even though member i tries to spend
more time on consumption).
∆Rc = δNprc (74)
Therefore the change in the total reward for member i is
∆R = δ ·Np(ηnrp + rc) < 0 # δ < 0 (75)
Case 2 done.
Combining Case 1 and Case 2, if and only if (72) is true, the change of αi
will result in a decrease of member i’s total reward, therefore the strategy of
choosing the original αi results in a Nash equilibrium. Completing the proof for
Theorem 2.
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C Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The Gmax -celebrity in Eq (3) is greater than or equal to the Gmax -uniform
in Eq (11) if and only if the following is true.
η(1− η)n2Np(rp + rc) ≥
ηn2NpNc(rc + rp)
Nc + ηnNp
(76)
⇔ 1− η ≥
Nc
Nc + ηnNp
(77)
⇔ (1− η)(Nc + ηnNp) ≥ Nc (78)
⇔ η(nNp −Nc + nηNp) ≥ 0 (79)
⇔ nNp −Nc + nηNp ≥ 0 (80)
⇔ η ≥
Nc − nNp
nNp
(81)
According to the modelling assumption in Eq (1), Nc − nNp ≤ 0, and since
η ≥ 0, the condition is (81) is always true. Completing the proof of Theorem 3.
